Summary This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Arguments Con Arguments Pro Ambivalence Concerning Relativism? Goldman, A. ), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. His central claim is that curiosity provides hope for a response-dependent or behaviour-centred explanation of the value of whatever curiosity involves or aims at. That said, Grimms more recent work (2014) expands on these earlier observations to form the basis of a view that spells out grasping in terms of a modal relationship between properties, objects or entitiesa theory on which what is grasped when one has understanding-why will be how changes in one would lead (or fail to lead) to changes in the other. On the view he recommends, the ability to grasp explanatory or evidential connections is an ability that is central to understanding only if the relevant grasping ability is understood as involving reliable explanatory evaluation. Wilkenfeld (2013) offers the account that most clearly falls under Kelps characterization of manipulationist approaches to understanding. Khalifas (2013) view of understanding is a form of explanatory idealism. by | Jun 9, 2022 | prayers of dedication presbyterian | advance australia national director | Jun 9, 2022 | prayers of dedication presbyterian | advance australia national director Hazlett, A. That said, the question of whether, and if so to what extent, understanding is compatible with epistemic luck, lacks any contemporary consensus, though this is an aspect of understanding that is receiving increased attention. Making such an epistemological shift can then open up the possibility of communication with other-than-human persons in ways that few educational researchers seem able (or willing) to acknowledge (see Harvey, 2003). This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. security guard 12 hour shifts aubrey pearsons oaks husband epistemological shift pros and cons. With each step in the sequence, we understand the motion of the planets better than we did before. Men Many seem to blend manipulationism with explanations, suggesting for example that what is required for understanding is an ability associated with mentally manipulating explanations. This type of understanding is ascribed in sentences that take the form I understand why X (for example, I understand why the house burnt down). ), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd Edition). Essentially, this view traditionally holds that understanding why X is the case is equivalent to knowing why X is the case (which is in turn supposed to be equivalent to knowing that X is the case because of Y). Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. A second variety of understanding that has generated interest amongst epistemologists is, understanding-why. This is perhaps partially because there is a tendency to hold a persons potential understanding to standards of objective appropriateness as well as subjective appropriateness. ), Epistemic Value. As Wilkenfeld sees it, understanding should be construed as representational manipulability, which is to say that understanding is, essentially, the possessing of some representation that can be manipulated in useful ways. epistemological shift pros and cons. In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. This is explained in the following way: If it is central to ordinary cognitive function that one is motivated to pursue X, then X has value in virtue of its place in this functional story. Regarding the comparison between the value of understanding and the value of knowledge, then, he will say that if understanding is fundamental to curiosity then this provides at least a partial explanation for why it is superior to the value of knowledge. For Defends the strong claim that propositional knowledge is necessary and sufficient for understanding. Hills (2009) is an advocate of such a view of understanding-why in particular. Gives an overview of recent arguments for revisionist theories of epistemic value that suggest understanding is more valuable than knowledge. How should we distinguish between peripheral beliefs about a subject matter and beliefs that are not properly, Understanding entails true beliefs of the form. Stephen P. Stitch: The Fragmentation of Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51(1) (1991): 189-193. Nevertheless, considering weakly factive construals of objective understanding draws attention to an important pointthat there are also interesting epistemic states in the neighborhood of understanding. This leaves us, however, with an interesting question about the point at which there is no understanding at all, rather than merely weaker or poorer understanding. Baker, L. R. Third Person Understanding in A. Sanford (ed. See further Bradford (2013; 2015) for resistance to the very suggestion that there can be weak achievements on Pritchards sensenamely, achievements that do not necessarily involve great effort, regardless of whether they are primarily due to ability. Specifically, Hills outlines six different abilities that she takes to be involved in grasping the reasons why pabilities which effectively constitute, on her view, six necessary conditions for understanding why p. These six abilities allow one to be able to treat q as the reason why p, not merely believe or know that q is the reason why p. They are as follows: (i) an ability to follow another persons explanation of why p. (ii) an ability to explain p in ones own words. Although the analysis of the value of epistemic states has roots in Plato and Aristotle, this renewed and more intense interest was initially inspired by two coinciding trends in epistemology. I side with positivism; which states knowledge can be found via empirical observations (obtained through the senses). In terms of parallels with the understanding debate, it is important to note that the knowledge of causes formula is not limited to the traditional propositional reading. There are three potential worries with this general style of approach. Abstract. in barn faade cases, where environmental luck is incompatible with knowledge but compatible with cognitive achievement) and the absence of cognitive achievement in the presence of knowledge (e.g. De Regt, H. and Dieks, D. A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding. Synthese 144 (2005): 137-170. Hempel, C. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. However, advocates of moderate approaches to the factivity of understanding are left with some difficult questions to answer. Contains Kims classic discussion of species of dependence (for example, mereological dependence). If Hills is right about this connection between grasping and possessing abilities, it might seem as though understanding-why is, at the end of the day, very similar to knowing-how (see, however, Sullivan 2017 for resistance to this suggestion).. He argues that what is grasped or seen when one attains a priori knowledge is not a proposition but a certain modal relationship between properties, objects or identities. Lucky Understanding Without Knowledge. Synthese 191 (2014): 945-959. Pritchard, D. Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value In A. OHear (ed. Disputes the popular claim that understanding is more epistemically valuable than knowledge. al 2014), have for understanding? The medical epistemology we propose conforms to the epistemological responsibility of doctors, which involves a specific professional attitude and epistemological skills. By contrast, Pritchard believes that understanding always involves strong cognitive achievement, that is, an achievement that necessarily involves either a significant exercise of skill or the overcoming of a significant obstacle. What is Justified Belief? In G. S. Pappas (ed. However, if understanding-why actually is a type of knowing how then this means that intellectualist arguments to the effect that knowing how is a kind of propositional knowledge might apply, mutatis mutandis, to understanding-why as well (see Carter and Pritchard 2013). Examines reasons to suppose that attributions of understanding are typically attributions of knowledge, understanding-why or objectual understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. More generally, as this line of criticism goes, sometimes we simply mistake mere (non-factive) intelligibility for understanding. Resists Pritchards claim that there can be weak achievements, that is, ones that do not necessarily involve great effort. Though her work on understanding is not limited to scientific understanding (for example, Elgin 2004), one notable argument she has made is framed to show that a factive conception cannot do justice to the cognitive contributions of science and that a more flexible conception can (2007: 32). Here is one potential example to illustrate this point: consider that it is not clear that people who desire to understand chemistry generally care about the cause of chemistry. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Since Kvanvig claims that the coherence-making relationships that are traditionally construed as necessary for justification on a coherentist picture are the very relations that one grasps (for example, the objects of grasping) when one understands, the justification literature may be a promising place to begin. For example: Although a moderate view of understandings factivity may look promising in comparison with competitor accounts, many important details remain left to be spelled out. epistemological shift pros and cons. Trout, J.D. 57-74, 2015. Proposes an account of understandings value that is related to its connection with curiosity. That said, this article nonetheless attempts to outline a selection of topics that have generated the most discussion and highlights what is at issue in each case and what some of the available positions are. Batterman, R. W. Idealization and modelling. Synthese, 169(3) (2009): 427-446. Why We Dont Deserve Credit for Everything We Know. Synthese 156 (2007). An overview of the object, psychology, and normativity of understanding. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005. Consider here two cases she offers to this effect: EVOLUTION: A second graders understanding of human evolution might include as a central strand the proposition that human beings descended from apes. There is debate about both (i) whether understanding-why might fairly be called explanatory understanding and (ii) how understanding-why might differ from propositional knowledge. For example, he attempts to explain the intuitions in Pritchards intervening luck spin on Kvanvigs Comanche case by noting that some of the temptation to deny understanding here relates to the writer of the luckily-true book himself lacking the relevant understanding. An epistemological shift: from evidence-based medicine to epistemological responsibility J Eval Clin Pract. Hence, he argues that any propositional knowledge is derivative. However, Pritchards work on epistemic luck (for example, 2005) and how it is incompatible with knowledge leads him to reason that understanding is immune to some but not all forms of malignant luck (that is, luck which is incompatible with knowledge). For, even if understanding why 22=4 does not require a grasp of any causal relation, it might nonetheless involve a grasp of some kind of more general dependence, for instance the kind of dependence picked out by the metaphysical grounding relation. London: Continuum, 2012. Explores the epistemological role of exemplification and aims to illuminate the relationship between understanding and scientific idealizations construed as fictions. A more charitable interpretation of Bakers position would be to read making reasonable sense more strongly. Includes further discussion of the role of acceptance and belief in her view of understanding. Contains Lackeys counterexamples to the knowledge transmission principles. Description Recall that epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. Kelp (2015) makes a helpful distinction between two broad camps here. He considers that grasping might be a modal sense or ability that allows the understander to, over and above registering how things are. Epistemological assumptions are those that focus on what can be known and how knowledge can be acquired (Bell, 8). That said, for manipulationists who are not already inclined to accept the entailment from all-knowing to omni-understanding, the efficacy against the manipulationist is diffused as the example does not get off the ground. and claims that this goes along with a shift away from studying the cognitive subject's conceptual grasp of objects towards a "reflection on the . Are the prospects of extending understanding via active externalism on a par with the prospects for extending knowledge, or is understanding essentially internal in a way that knowledge need not be? This view, while insisting that central beliefs must all be true, is flexible enough to accommodate that there are degrees of understandingthat is, that understanding varies not just according to numbers of true beliefs but also numbers of false, peripheral beliefs. But more deeply, atemporal phenomena such as mathematical truths have, in one clear sense, never come to be at all, but have always been, to the extent that they are the case at all. For one thing, abstract objects, such as mathematical truths and other atemporal phenomena, can plausibly be understood even though our understanding of them does not seem to require an appreciation of their coming to existence. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0863-z. Therefore, the need to adopt a weak factivity constraint on objectual understandingat least on the basis of cases that feature idealizationslooks at least initially to be unmotivated in the absence of a more sophisticated view about the relationship between factivity, belief and acceptance (however, see Elgin 2004). Kvanvig (2013) claims that both of these views are mistaken, and in the course of doing so, locates curiosity at the center of his account of understandings value. For example, Kvanvig describes it as obtaining when understanding grammatically is followed by an object/subject matter, as in understanding the presidency, or the president, or politics (2003: 191). Rohwer argues that counterexamples like Pritchards intervening luck cases only appear plausible because the beliefs that make up the agents understanding come exclusively from a bad source. For one thing, it is prudent to note up front that there are uses of understanding that, while important more generally in philosophy, fall outside the purview of mainstream epistemology. A potential worry then is that the achievement one attains when one understands chemistry need not involve the subject working the subject matterin this case, chemistryscause. On the most straightforward characterization of her proposal, one fails to possess understanding why, with respect to p, if one lacks any of the abilities outlined in (i-vi), with respect to p. Note that this is compatible with one failing to possess understanding why even if one possesses knowledge that involves, as virtue epistemologists will insist, some kinds of abilities or virtues. The idea of grasping* is useful insofar as it makes clearer the cognitive feat involved in intelligibility, which is similar to understanding in the sense that it implies a grasping of order, pattern and connection between propositions (Riggs, 2004), but it does not require those propositions to be true. What kind of historical enterprise is historical epistemology? His conception of mental representations defines these representations as computational structures with content that are susceptible to mental transformations. Wilkenfeld constructs a necessary condition on objectual understanding around this definition. Kim, J. The Case of Richard Rorty A Newer Argument Pro: Hales's Defense o. Includes criticism of Kvanvigs line on epistemic luck and understanding. The group designated explanationists by Kelp (2015) share a general commitment to the idea that knowledge of explanations should play a key role in a theory of understanding (for example, Hempel 1965; Salmon 1989; Khalifa 2012; 2013). However, Baker (2003) has offered an account on which at least some instances of understanding-why are non-factive. If Kelps thought experiment works, manipulation of representations cannot be a necessary condition of understanding after all. Of course, many interrelated questions then emerge regarding coherence. The Varieties of Cognitive Success 1.1 What Kinds of Things Enjoy Cognitive Success? Gordon, E. C. Is There Propositional Understanding? Logos & Episteme 3 (2012): 181-192. Hills thinks that moral understanding, if it were any kind of propositional knowledge at all, would be knowing a proposition under a practical mode and not necessarily under a theoretical mode.. Kvanvig stipulates that there are no falsehoods in the relevant class of beliefs that this individual has acquired from the book, and also that she can correctly answer all relevant questions whilst confidently believing that she is expressing the truth. Zagzebski does not mean to say that to understand X, one must also understand ones own understanding of X (as this threatens a psychologically implausible regress), but rather, that to understand X one must also understand that one understands X. The topic of epistemic value has only relatively recently received sustained attention in mainstream epistemology. The underlying idea in play here is that, in short, thinking about how things would be if it were true is an efficacious way to get to further truths; an insight has attracted endorsement in the philosophy of science (for example, Batterman 2009). Epistemology is often defined as the theory of knowledge, and talk of propositional knowledge (that is, S knows that p) has dominated the bulk of modern literature in epistemology. 4 Pages. [] In this respect, then, Kvanvigs view achieves the result of a middle ground. For example, Hills (2009: 4) says you cannot understand why p if p is false (compare: S knows that p only if p). Grimm develops this original position via parity of reasoning, taking as a starting point that the debate about a priori knowledge, for example, knowledge of necessary truths, makes use of metaphors of grasping and seeing that are akin to the ones in the understanding debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. To the extent that this is correct, there is some cause for reservation about measuring degrees of understanding according to how well they approximate the benefits provided by knowing a good and correct explanation. A proponent of Khalifas position might, however, view the preceding response as question-begging. Discuss the pros and cons of the epistemological shift in an essay. In addition, it is important to make explicit differences in terminology that can sometimes confuse discussions of some types of understanding. Moral Understanding and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 172(2) (2015): 113-128. This holds regardless of whether we are Platonists or nominalists about such entities. ), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. In so doing, he notes that the reader may be inclined to add further internalist requirements to his reliability requirement, of the sort put forward by Kvanvig (2003). While Pritchard can agree with Rohwers conclusion that understanding (and specifically as Rohwer is interested in, scientific understanding) is not a species of knowledge, the issue of adjudicating between Rohwers intuition in the case of unifying understanding and the diagnosis Pritchard will be committed to in such a case is complicated. Grimm (2006) and Pritchard (2010) counter that many of the most desirable instances of potential understanding, such as when we understand another persons psychology or understand how the world works, are not transparent. This is a point Elgin is happy to grant. Take first the object question. He also suggests that what epistemic agents want is not just to feel like they are making sense of things but to actually make sense of them. Elgin (2007), like Zagzebski, is sympathetic to a weak factivity constraint on objectual understanding, where the object of understanding is construed as a fairly comprehensive, coherent body of information (2007: 35). Consider a student saying, I thought I understood this subject, but my recent grade suggests I dont understand it after all. Utilize at least 2 credible sources to support the arguments presented in the paper. He takes his account to be roughly in line with the laymans concept of curiosity. On this basis Pritchard insists that Grimms analogy breaks down. Grimm (2012) has wondered whether this view might get things explanatorily backwards. Running head: SHIFT IN EPISTEMOLOGY 1 Shift in Epistemology Student's Name Professor's Name Institution If making reasonable sense merely requires that some event or experience make sense to the epistemic agent herself, Bakers view appears open, as Grimm (2011) has suggested, to counterexamples according to which an agent knows that something happened and yet accounts for that occurrence by way of a poorly supported theory. But is understanding factive? Greco, J. Kvanvig, J. Morris (2012), like Rohwer, also defends lucky understandingin particular, understanding-why, or what he calls explanatory understanding). In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. (iv) an ability to draw from the information q the conclusion that p (or probably p), (v) an ability to give q (the right explanation) when given the information that p, and. University of Edinburgh ), Knowledge, Truth and Obligation. Toon (2015) has recently suggested, with reference to the hypothesis of extended cognition, that understanding can be located partly outside the head. This is because we dont learn about causes a priori. Discusses and defines ability in the sense often appealed to in work on cognitive ability and the value of knowledge. Proposes a framework for reducing objectual understanding to what he calls explanatory understanding. He suggests that manipulating the system allows the understander to see the way in which the manipulation influences (or fails to influence) other parts of the system (2011: 11). New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Given that the instrumental value is the same, our reaction to the two contrasting bypass cases seems to count in favor of the final value of successes because of abilityachievements. The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 57-69. Morris, K. A Defense of Lucky Understanding. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2012): 357-371. This objection is worth holding in mind when considering any further positions that incorporate representation manipulability as necessary. ), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. If a grasping condition is necessary for understanding, does one satisfy this condition only when one exercises a grasping ability to reflect how things are in the world? Morris suggests that the writer of the Comanche book might lack understanding due to failing to endorse the relevant propositions, while the reader might have understanding because she does endorse the relevant proposition. The guiding task was to clarify what versions of historical epistemology exist and the pros and cons each of them presents. Assume that the surgeon is suffering from the onset of some degenerative mental disease and the first symptom is his forgetting which blood vessel he should be using to bypass the narrowed section of the coronary artery. Thirdly, even if one accepts something like a moderate factivity requirement on objectual understandingand thus demand of at least a certain class of beliefs one has of a subject matter that they be trueone can also ask further and more nuanced questions about the epistemic status of these true beliefs. And, thirdly, two questions about what is involved in grasping can easily be run together, but should be kept separate. Consider the view that the kinds of epistemic luck that suffice to undermine knowledge do not also undermine understanding. Argues that understanding (unlike knowledge) is a type of cognitive achievement and therefore of distinctive value. Specifically, he points out that an omniscient agent who knows everything and intuitively therefore understands every phenomenon might do so while being entirely passivenot drawing interferences, making predictions or manipulating representations (in spite of knowing, for example, which propositions can be inferred from others). CA: Wadsworth, 2009. What is the grasping relation? Bradford, G. The Value of Achievements. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94(2) (2013): 204-224. The Psychology of Scientific Explanation. Philosophy Compass 2(3) (2007): 564-591. Secondly, even subject matters that traffic in empirical rather than abstract atemporal phenomena (for example, pure mathematics), are not clearly such that understanding them should involve any appreciation for their coming to be, or their being caused to exist. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. The Myth of Factive Verbs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80:3 (2010): 497-522. Grimm does not make the further claim that understanding is a kind of know-howhe merely says that there is similarity regarding the object, which does not guarantee that the activity of understanding and know-how are so closely related. It seems as though understanding would possibly be undermined in a case where someone relying on the ideal gas law failed to appreciate it as an idealization. So the kind of knowledge that it provides is metaknowledgeknowledge about knowledge. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. To borrow a case from Riggs, stealing an Olympic medal or otherwise cheating to attain it lacks the kind of value one associates with earning the medal, through ones own skill. That said, Hills adds some qualifications. Positivism follows an identical approach as the study of natural sciences in the testing of a theory. Taking curiosity to be of epistemic significance is not a new idea. To complicate matters further, some of the philosophers who appear to endorse one approach over the other can elsewhere be seen considering a more mixed view (for example, Khalifa 2013b).